〔フクシマ核惨事は教訓化されたか？〕◆ 日本の原子力規制はなお原子力業界となお甘すぎる関係、ハッキリした責任体制をつくる上げるべきだ！ / ＦＡＳ（米科学者連盟）が、フクイチ後の日本の原発規制の問題点をレポートで指摘！ / さらに……日本の電力会社の社員はフルタイムの正社員だが、日本の原発作業員の８８％は契約労働者―― 日本の原子力規制員会は原発作業員の専門職化に指導性を発揮しなければならない、とも！

　★　ＦＡＳのレポートは、amakudari（天下り）問題にも、さらには原発推進当局と規制当局の「回転ドア」問題にも言及している。

　事故２年後のレポートだが、日本がフクイチ核惨事に、原発規制面でも多くのことを学んでいない――あるいは学んだふりをして抜け道をつくっている姿が浮き彫りにされている。

　第２、第３の原発核惨事が起きても、不思議ではない！

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　〔★は大沼〕◎　Federation of American Scientists　：　　Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident　
　２０１３年５月　
　⇒　http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Regulating_Japanese_Nuclear_13May131.pdf

　　・　The NRA must take the lead in professionalizing the nuclear industry workforce by setting high standards for education and training for the industry’s workforce. According to data provided to The Los Angeles Times by NISA, 88 percent of the 83,000 workers at Japan’s nuclear power plants are contract workers as opposed to full-time employees of the utility companies that own the plants.
　（１８ページ）

　・　To whatever extent it is believed that the NRA’s relationship with industry is still too cozy and regulators will be too reticent to take a firm stance on safety issues or mete out punishment, it may behoove Japan to consider incorporating greater automaticity into the decision-making process. Remembering that regulation is carried out by human beings, clearer guidelines about what to do can help reduce uncertainty for regulators when it comes to reporting or responding to potential problems. Reducing this uncertainty closes the “window of opportunity” for industry to influence the individuals making regulatory decisions. However, this carries a substantial risk of backfiring, which brings up an important point that needs to be made before closing this discussion on the regulatory framework and process.　（２３ページ）

  ・　Apart from independence, another major issue that the Fukushima Daiichi accident revealed is the importance of formulating clear, specific, and appropriate institutional responsibilities when it comes to ensuring safety. The chaos surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident proved that Japan must improve in accident management preparation and coordination. As the shortcomings of the NSC and NISA also suggest, a lack of clarity in job descriptions and organizational roles hindered the modernization of safety regulations and the cultivation of a safety culture within the industry. It is noteworthy that the first recommendation of the IRRS report on Japan was that “the role of NISA as the regulatory body and that of NSC, especially in producing safety guides, should be clarified.”（１７ページ）

　・　Looking at the NRA specifically, Japan will need to expand its size substantially beyond the roughly 460 it will employ over the near term after borrowing most of those staff from NISA. Specifically, it should devote substantial efforts to overcoming bureaucratic barriers that are standing in the way of incorporating JNES’s 490 staff members into the NRA and increasing the NRA’s budget accordingly. The NRA’s current budget of approximately $573 million (~¥55 billion) will also need to be increased accordingly. The total of about 950 personnel would still be less than one-quarter of the size of the U.S. NRC while Japan’s 54 reactors at 18 power plants represents slightly more than half of the 104 reactors that the United States has at 65 nuclear power plants.　　（同）

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◎　関連　参考　/　ＦｏＥジャパン　：　何が問題？　原子力規制委員会の人事
　　⇒　http://www.foejapan.org/energy/action/120726_2.html